










“Admissibilidade da prova no processo penal: entre a busca pela 
verdade, os direitos humanos e a eficiência do procedimento”
273
After zigzagging between extremes, finally 
common sense? Will Belgium return to reasonable 
rules on illegally obtained evidence?
Depois de ziguezaguear entre os extremos, finalmente senso comum? 









“Just as every cop is a criminal
And all the sinners saints
As heads is tails
Just call me Lucifer
‘Cause I’m in need of some restraint”
(The Rolling Stones – Sympathy for the Devil)
AbstrAct: In the absence of statutory rules on the matter, Belgian 
courts traditionally applied a strict exclusionary rule for illegally 
gathered evidence and its fruits. The Court of Cassation in 2003 made 
a spectacular U-turn and prohibited exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence by criminal courts, with only very limited exceptions. 
Parliament subsequently incorporated these judge-made principles 
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into a binding statutory rule. As a new Code is about to be debated 
in Parliament, the time is right to question the “normalisation” of 
law enforcement officers’ disrespect for the rules. The Rule of Law 
will be restored by making exclusion of illegally gathered evidence 
the rule, but exceptionally allowing its use upon consideration of 
the conflicting interests.
Keywords: Illegally obtained evidence; Admissibility; Fair trial; 
Exclusionary rule; Codification. 
resumo: Diante da omissão de normas sobre a questão, as cortes belgas 
tradicionalmente aplicavam regras rígidas de exclusão de provas obtidas 
ilegalmente e suas derivadas. A Corte de Cassação em 2003 alterou drasti-
camente tal posição e proibiu os tribunais de excluir as provas ilícitas, salvo 
exceções bastante limitadas. O Legislativo então incorporou esses princípios 
em uma regra legal obrigatória. Considerando os debates legislativos sobre 
um novo código, o momento é adequado para discutir a normalização 
do desrespeito às regras pelos agentes estatais. O Estado de Direito será 
restaurado com a consolidação da regra de exclusão das provas ilícitas, 
mas com a possibilidade de utilização excepcional a partir de ponderação 
de conflito de interesses.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: provas ilícitas; admissibilidade; justo processo; regra de 
exclusão; codificação.
i. introduction: thE End of thE napolEonic Era 
Napoleon Bonaparte introduced a series of codes, but the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (1808) has never been considered a highlight.3 Upon 
gaining independence in the 19th Century, Belgium kept using this French 
Code with the intention of replacing it by one of its own: a Belgian code.4 In 
2020, it still has that intention… Of course, the ‘Napoleonic’ Belgian Code 
3 C. Van Den Wyngaert, P. Traest, S. Vandromme, Strafrecht en strafproces-
recht, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2017, 13.
4 J. Monballyu, Zes eeuwen strafrecht, de geschiedenis van het Belgische strafrecht 
(1400-2000) (Six Centuries of Criminal Law, the History of Belgian Criminal 
Law (1400-2000)), Leuven, Acco, 2006, 47-55.
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of Criminal Procedure (CCP) has undergone many changes, very often 
under pressure of the European Court of Human Rights, which insists on 
an explicit and specific legal base for government intrusion upon citizens’ 
rights. The matter of evidence was hardly regulated by the old code and 
the European Court of Human Rights has always been quite reluctant to 
seem to be interfering too much.5 Hence the matter was left to Belgian 
courts and doctrine. In the early 21st Century the highest court in the 
criminal justice system, the Court of Cassation, made a remarkable U-turn 
on the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence. Except in very 
rare situations, courts are now obliged to use illegal evidence. Parliament 
codified this rule in 2013. This contribution is mainly a description for 
foreign readers of the remarkable Belgian situation. Upon a request from 
the Belgian government, an expert committee has, however, issued a draft 
for a new code and Parliament is expected to start discussing it in 2021. 
It proposes an adjustment of the statutory rules on this fundamental 
issue. Hence we end with some personal reflections on this proposal.6. 
5 It uses the standard clause that Article 6 E.C.H.R. “does not lay down any rules 
on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is primarily a matter for the reg-
ulation under national law. It is not for the Court to determine particular types 
of evidence –for example, evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic 
law –may be admissible. The question which must be answered is whether the 
proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was gathered 
were fair.” (ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 10 March 2009, n.4378/02, Bykov/
Russia, § 88, see also ECtHR 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, Schenk/ Switzer-
land, § 45; ECtHR 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-IV, Teixeira de Castro/ Portu-
gal, § 34). 
6 This is a somewhat subjective, we would say ‘principled but pragmatic’ ap-
proach. It is based on our belief that both the absolute exclusionary rule and 
its opposite (the compulsory maximal use of illegally gathered evidence to 
convict suspects) fail to strike a proper balance between the conflicting in-
terests at stake. For a legal system to be coherent, the principle is that rules 
should be applied and exceptions to that principle require a justification that 
can be checked. However, the ‘rules to be applied as much as possible’ do 
not only cover the rules of procedure to be respected by law enforcement, 
but also the substantive criminal law to be enforced. That entails a complex 
balancing act. We wonder which use of an exclusionary rule would lead to 
a ‘maximal application of the rules’. The crux is that we think that statutory 
law should indicate which interests should be taken into account, but that, 
except for extreme situations like torture, the judge of the facts is best placed 
to consider the appropriate balance in the specific case (infra).
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ii. gEnEral principlEs of bElgian criMinal procEdural law
The Belgian legal system is embedded in a civil law tradition. 
Statutory legislation is the main source of law for both criminal law and 
criminal procedure. The system is mainly inquisitorial, although the 
number of accusatorial features is increasing. The pre-trial stage is still 
characterised by its mainly secret and inquisitorial nature, while the trial 
stage is public and the principles of adversarial argument apply. 
At the pre-trial stage, two types of investigations can be 
distinguished: the preliminary investigation and the judicial inquiry. 
A preliminary investigation is led by the public prosecutor, a judicial 
inquiry by an (impartial and independent) investigating judge under the 
supervision of the Indictment Chamber of the Court of Appeal. A judicial 
inquiry is required as soon as a victim files a civil complaint with the 
investigating judge or when an investigative measure has to be carried out 
that belongs to the sole competence of the investigating judge. Measures 
belonging to the sole competence of the investigating judge are typically 
measures which are considered very privacy-intrusive and far-reaching 
(e.g. home searches, wiretaps, covert computer searches, …). However, 
privacy-intrusive measures are increasingly shifting towards the public 
prosecutor’s office. The investigating judge can authorise any measure 
that the public prosecutor may also authorise. The vast majority of the 
criminal cases (approximately 95%) is however dealt with by means of 
a preliminary investigation. 
Since the procedural regime in case of a judicial inquiry is 
burdensome and entails an especially complex procedure at the end of 
the investigative stage, Parliament introduced a simplified intermediate 
procedure called the “mini judicial inquiry” (art. 28septies CCP). In this 
procedure the intervention of the investigating judge is limited to a one-
off authorisation (or refusal) to carry out an investigative measure. As a 
result, an increasing amount of investigative measures belonging to the 
exclusive competence of the investigating judge no longer require the 
start of a judicial inquiry: in spite of the use of the intrusive measure, the 
investigation remains with the public prosecutor. Nevertheless, even if 
the public prosecutor only filed a limited request for such a mini judicial 
inquiry, the investigating judge always retains the option of taking over the 
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whole investigation and starting a judicial inquiry. Additionally, certain 
specific investigative measures are excluded from the mini judicial inquiry 
and thus always require a judicial inquiry.7 
Under the principle of equality of arms, the parties are granted 
access to all evidence that has been collected, at the latest once the 
investigation is completed. This ensures the fairness of the proceedings 
and allows the parties to prepare their case. In more general terms, the 
prosecution should add all elements to the case file which could be relevant 
to establish the truth about what happened.8 Law enforcement authorities 
should also be sufficiently transparent about how they conducted their 
investigation, about its results and how the evidence encountered has 
been handled. In the investigation phase, the procedure is essentially 
a written one. Law enforcement officers write official reports on the 
investigation measures they carry out and must include them in the 
case file. However, Belgian law lacks general statutory provisions on 
which information should be included in the official report.9 Adequate 
transparency is required, to allow the parties to the proceedings to verify 
the reliability of the evidence and the legality of the investigation and to 
raise potential problems before the court.10 
Belgium has rather few explicit rules on assessment of evidence. 
Once evidence is allowed in court, judges can freely assess the reliability 
and weight of the evidence put before them and are only bound by their 
’deep-down conviction’ (innerlijke overtuiging – l’intime conviction).11 
Specific exceptions to the free assessment of evidence are rare. The 
following types of evidence should be sufficiently corroborated by 
7 Such as a home search (Constitutional Court 21 December 2017, n° 148/2017). 
8 Court of Cassation 30 October 2001, AR P.01.1239.N, Arr. Cass. 2001, 1815. 
9 C.Conings, Klassiek en digitaal speuren naar strafrechtelijk bewijs, Antwerp, 
Intersentia, 2017, 360-361; T. Decaigny, Tegenspraak in het vooronderzoek, 
Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2013, 361. 
10 An important difference exists between evidence and police information 
which is only used to start or direct the investigation. Infra Evidence vs. po-
lice information.
11 S. De Decker, F. Verbruggen, “Across the River and Into the Poisonous Trees. 
From exclusion to the Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in Criminal Pro-
ceedings in Belgium”, in The XIIIth World Congress of Procedural Law: the 
Belgian and Dutch Reports, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2008, 65.
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additional elements of proof: statements of anonymous witnesses12, 
statements made by teleconference13, statements of an offender assisting 
the authorities (‘rewarded turncoat’’)14, the results of a polygraph test15 
and evidence obtained via a civilian undercover agent16. The principle of 
free assessment concerns the probative value, it does not allow the judge 
to alter the content of the evidence or official reports in the case file.17 
iii. dEfinition illEgally obtainEd EvidEncE 
1. IllegAlIty
If a judge is confronted with illegally obtained evidence, the 
question arises whether such evidence is admissible in court. Before 
answering this question, we will clarify under which circumstances 
evidence is considered to be ‘obtained illegally’. The Court of Cassation 
clearly defined ‘illegally obtained evidence’ in 2004.18 Evidence is 
considered illegal if it has been gathered (i) by committing an offence, 
(ii) in violation of criminal procedural law, (iii) in violation of the right to 
privacy (art. 8 ECHR), (iv) in violation of the rights of the defence (art. 
6 ECHR) or (v) in violation of the right to human dignity. The grounds 
of illegality are often interchangeable. For instance, most offences will 
infringe upon criminal procedural legislation, violations of human dignity 
will often be covered by a criminal offence and most infringements upon 
12 Art. 189bis CCP.
13 Art. 112bis §6 CCP.
14 Art. 216/4 CCP.
15 Art. 112duodecies §10 CCP. 
16 I.e. not a sworn police officer, especially trained for such missions: Art. 
47novies/3 §3 CCP. 
17 S. De Decker, F. Verbruggen, “Across the River and Into the Poisonous Trees. 
From exclusion to the Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in Criminal Pro-
ceedings in Belgium”, in The XIIIth World Congress of Procedural Law: the 
Belgian and Dutch Reports, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2008, 65.
18 Court of Cassation decision of 23 March 2004, AR P.04.0012.N, RABG 2004, 
1061, with comment by F. Schuermans as confirmed in Court of Cassation 
decision of 21 November 2006, AR P.06.0806.N.
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criminal procedural law will also entail a violation of the right to privacy 
since the interference with private law will not be in accordance with the 
law as required by article 8 ECHR 
The category of violation of criminal procedure legislation is 
furthermore not limited to specific formal rules of procedure. The 
prosecutor and investigating judge have a statutory duty to safeguard 
the loyalty or integrity of the evidence gathering process.19 Evidence 
gathered in a disloyal manner must be considered as ‘illegally obtained’, 
e.g. when a formal procedure is deliberately averted from its purpose 
to render illegally obtained evidence legal (‘evidence laundering’, a 
pretended ‘accidental’ discovery of evidence which was actually ‘staged’)20 
or when the entire criminal investigation is based on the assumption that 
someone is guilty of an offence21. The latter situation will of course also 
run afoul of the presumption of innocence and will thus be in breach 
of the right to a fair trial. 
Electronic evidence can be altered easily and is very volatile by 
nature. Yet Belgian law lacks specific technical rules on how it should 
be gathered and treated. Rules do exist on the circumstances in which 
law enforcement agencies can access electronic evidence, but there is no 
detailed legal regime for technical requirements regarding the execution 
of a search for digital evidence, nor clear requirements regarding the tools 
which may be used to perform such searches. Criminal procedural law 
only refers to ‘suitable technical means’22, which should be used to gather 
and preserve digital evidence to ensure its integrity and confidentiality. 
Guidelines seem to exist at the level of the public prosecutors’ office and 
police forces but they are not accessible to the public.23 The statutory 
19 Art. 28bis in fine CCP and art. 56 CCP. 
20 Brussels 10 December 2010, JT 2011, 54; Corr. Brussels 8 December 2009, JT 
2010, 6-13, with comment. 
21 Mons 26 november 2014, JT 2015, n. 6607, 467. 
22 Art. 39bis §8 CCP and 90septies §1 CCP. 
23 J. Kerhofs, P. Van Linthout, Cybercrime 3.0, Brussels, Politeia, 2019, 235. 
Guidelines also exist at the European level. The Electronic Evidence Guide, 
which has been created at the level of the Council of Europe is a basic guide for 
police officers, prosecutors and judges containing guidelines on the handling 
of digital evidence in all phases of the criminal investigation, prosecution 
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requirement to use ‘suitable technical means’ entails that if a judge deems 
the specific technical tools used be the investigators ‘unsuitable’, e.g. when 
electronic data are altered while executing a search (such as when the 
configuration of the computer system under investigation is changed), 
the evidence will have been ‘illegally obtained’. This will inevitably entail 
difficult factual and technical discussions.
2. IllegAlIty: commItted by whom?24 
Evidence is not only considered to be have been obtained illegally 
when the criminal prosecution authorities engaged in the illegal action. 
Illegal gathering of evidence by a private person may also affect its use 
in a criminal procedure. The Court of Cassation, however, only considers 
such evidence as ‘illegally obtained’ if two conditions are met: (i) the 
person who committed the illegality is the one who reported the offence 
to the law enforcement authorities and (ii) he or she engaged in the illegal 
action to obtain goods or information with the intention of using it as 
evidence in a criminal case.25
If the person who reported the offence to the authorities came 
across the data or goods by accident – albeit in an illegal manner, 
e.g. by burglary – said data or goods will not be considered ‘illegally 
obtained’ and can therefore simply be used as evidence in a criminal 
case.26 The same is true for the data or goods that were handed over 
and during trial. It is based on best practices and national and international 
standards in the countries which are a party to the Cybercrime Convention. 
The guide is available at https://rm.coe.int/09000016809efd7f.
24 S. De Decker, F. Verbruggen, “Across the River and Into the Poisonous Trees. 
From exclusion to the Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in Criminal Pro-
ceedings in Belgium”, in The XIIIth World Congress of Procedural Law: the Bel-
gian and Dutch Reports, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2008, 70-71; R.Verstraeten, 
Handboek Strafvordering, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2012, 987-988.
25 Court of Cassation decision of 17 January 1990, Arr.Cass. 1989-90, no. 310; 
Court of Cassation decision of 23 March 2004, AR P.04.0012.N, RABG 2004, 
1061, with comment by F. Schuermans; Court of Cassation decision of 21 
November 2006, AR P.06.0806.N. 
26 Court of Cassation decision of 9 December 1997, RW 1997-98, 1441.
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to law enforcement authorities by a person who was not involved in 
the illegal action.27
The Court also distinguishes between the actual illegal gathering 
of evidence and the mere illegal discovery of an offence. In the latter case, 
the person (including foreign authorities) who discovered the offence 
can report it to Belgian law enforcement authorities. This will not affect 
the legality of the evidence that is subsequently gathered by the Belgian 
law enforcement authorities.28 
3. evIdence vs. PolIce InformAtIon 
In a broader sense Belgian courts distinguish illegally obtained 
evidence from ‘police information’ which is only used to start or direct 
the criminal investigation and is not used by the trial judge to establish 
his deep-down conviction on the existence of the offence or the criminal 
liability of the defendants.29 
Evidence must always be subjected to judicial scrutiny30 and 
adversarial proceedings. By contrast, police information, i.e. information 
from police sources which the enforcement authorities do not (wish to) 
disclose and the exact origin of which is therefore typically unknown 
(informer, anonymous source, independent foreign investigation31, …), will 
not be subjected to full judicial control on whether the procedural rules 
applicable to the gathering of such information have been respected. Police 
information can therefore only serve to launch the criminal investigation 
27 Court of Cassation decision of 14 February 2001, JT 2001, 593; Court of Cassation 
decision of 18 May 2011, AR P.10.2049.F, ECLI:BE:CASS:2011:ARR.20110518.17. 
28 Court of Cassation decision of 30 May 1995, Arr. Cass. 1995, n. 267, JLMB 
1998, 488, with comment by F. Kuty; Court of Cassation decision of 2 April 
2008, AR P.07.1744.F, JT 2008, 390, with comment by F. Kuty; Court of Cas-
sation decision of 18 May 2011, AR P.10.2049.F.
29 V. Vereecke, “Politionele informatie ontsnapt aan de Antigoon-toets” (comment 
on Court of Cassation decision 28 Februari 2017), T. Strafr. 2017, n. 4, 269.
30 F. Schuermans, “Cassatie bevestigt bijzonder statuut politionele aanvangsin-
formatie”, Juristenkrant 2015, n. 306, 2.
31 Court of Cassation decision of 18 April 2017, AR P.16.1292.N, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2017:ARR.20170418.12 .
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and steer its course. It can for instance help selecting places or persons as 
a target for surveillance or searches, whereas the actual evidence will only 
be gathered in the course of the surveillance or the search. In the same 
sense, the Court of Cassation has considered that “information gathered 
by the police that may give rise to further investigation is only ordinary 
information that must be verified by a preliminary or judicial investigation”.32
Police information can only be challenged by defendants who 
can make it plausible that it has been obtained in an irregular manner. 
Mere ignorance of the origin of the information does not prevent it 
from being used to start or direct the investigation: that is not in itself 
sufficient to establish an irregularity. The Court of Cassation indeed held 
repeatedly that art. 6 ECHR does not preclude information of unknown 
origin from being taken into account as ‘steering information’, a basis for 
subsequent gathering of ‘real’ evidence, as long as it does not appear that 
the information has been gathered irregularly.33 This has been criticised 
as offering too much scope for ‘evidence laundering’.34 
When a defendant makes it plausible that the police information 
was gathered in an illegal way, the law enforcement authorities will have 
to clarify how the information was obtained. If they do not succeed in 
establishing the legal origin of the information, the judge will assume it 
has been obtained in an irregular way35. The rules on the use of illegally 
obtained evidence (threefold test, infra) do not apply to illegally obtained 
32 Court of Cassation decision of 27 September 2016, AR P.15.0852.N, 
ECLI:BE:CASS:2016:ARR.20160927.3. 
33 Court of Cassation decision 21 January 2003, AR P.01.1121.N; Court of 
Cassation decision 5 February 2013, AR P.12.0673.N; Court of Cassation 
decision 10 September 2013, P.13.0376.N; Court of Cassation decision 1 
December 2015, AR P.15.0905.N, ECLI:BE:CASS:2015:ARR.20151201.4; 
Court of Cassation decision 27 September 2016, AR P.15.0852.N, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2016:ARR.20160927.3. See also: F. Schuermans, “De zoektocht naar of 
de jacht op de oorsprong van de politionele informatie als start van een stra-
frechtelijk vooronderzoek”, T. Strafr. 2014, n.1, 48.
34 That is why experts suggest abolishing this distinction, see paragraph 
VII. below.
35 V. Vereecke, “Politionele informatie ontsnapt aan de Antigoon-toets” 
(comment on Court of Cassation decision 28 Februari 2017), T. Strafr. 
2017, n. 4, 270. 
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police information. The judge only verifies whether the right to a fair 
trial would be violated if the police information is used.36 
iv. usE of illEgally obtainEd EvidEncE 
1. from exclusIon to AdmIssIon 
Traditionally (from the 1920s onwards) the courts and doctrine 
stressed that illegally obtained evidence could not be used in court against 
the suspect.37 From 2003 onwards, the Court of Cassation, however, 
drastically curtailed the exclusionary rule (developing the so-called 
Antigoon-theory)38, and actually turned the tables: it made exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence the exception rather than the rule. On several 
occasions, the Constitutional Court has condoned this new approach.39
36 Court of Cassation decision 28 February 2017, AR P.16.0261.N, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2017:ARR.20170228.3; Court of Cassation decision of 18 April 2017, 
AR P.16.1292.N, ECLI:BE:CASS:2017:ARR.20170418.12 (in relation to infor-
mation coming from a foreign investigation). 
37 Court of Cassation decision of 12 March 1923, Pas. 1923, I, 233; Court of 
Cassation decision of 10 December 1924, Pas. 1924, I, 66; Court of Cassation 
decision 8 January 1945, Pas. 1945, I, 81; Court of Cassation decision of 24 
May 1948, RW 1948-49, 51, with comment; Court of Cassation decision of 
13 May 1986, AR 9136, Arr.Cass. 1985-86, 1230, concl. J. Du Jardin; Court of 
Cassation decision of 4 January 1994, AR 6388, Arr.Cass. 1994, 1, concl. J. Du 
Jardin, R. Cass. 1994, 75, with comment by P. Traest, RW 1994-95, 185, with 
comment by F. D’Hondt; Court of Cassation decision of 24 April 1996, AR 
P.96.0350.F, Arr.Cass. 1996, 334; Court of Cassation decision of 9 December 
1997, AR P.97.1329.N, Arr.Cass. 1997, 1330; Court of Cassation decision of 
23 December 1998, AR A.94.0001.F, Arr.Cass. 1998, 1166; Court of Cassation 
decision of 13 January 1999, AR P.98.0412.F, Arr.Cass. 1999, 28.
38 It owes its name to a legendary figure in Antwerp folklore who had pro-
vided the codename for the police action in the course of which the illegal 
gathering of evidence had happened: Court of Cassation decision of 14 Oc-
tober 2003, AR P.03.0762.N, Arr.Cass. 2003, 1862, RABG 2004, n. 6, 333, 
with comment by F. Schuermans, RCJB 2004, n. 4, 405, with comment by F. 
Kuty, RW 2003-04, 814, concl. M. De Swaef, T.Strafr. 2004, n. 2, 129, with 
comment by P. Traest.
39 Constitutional Court 22 December 2010, n. 158/2010, B.7. It treated the issue 
in a remarkably succinct matter: after reminding that the European Court of 
Human Rights repeatedly had decided that the use of evidence was mainly a 
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In 2004, the new approach was codified for the first time, but 
only in relation to evidence obtained abroad.40 In 2013, and once more 
without much legislative debate, a new article 32 was introduced in the 
Preliminary Title of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter: PT 
CCP), which codified the Antigoon doctrine. 
Under art. 32 PT CCP the judge may declare illegally obtained 
evidence inadmissible only if: 
(i) statute law explicitly mentions nullity as the sanction for 
neglecting the formality; 
(ii) the irregularity affects the reliability of the evidence; or 
(iii) the use of the illegally obtained evidence would violate the 
right to a fair trial. 
Said three grounds for exclusion of evidence have to be considered 
as exclusive: only in the given three scenarios the evidence can and has to 
be excluded.41 As Maes points out42, neither the Court of Cassation, nor 
the drafters of article 32 CCP have given theoretical reasons or invoked an 
explicit underlying vision on the function of the exclusionary rule to justify 
why it should be limited to these three grounds. The ratio, both behind 
the Court of Cassation’s U-turn and Parliament’s decision to codify it, 
seems to be an increasing irritation with suspects and defendants invoking 
matter of member state law and that the use of evidence gathered in violation 
of article 8 ECHR did not necessarily lead to a violation of article 6 ECHR, 
it stressed that the corresponding clauses in the Belgian constitution did not 
explicitly contain such a ban on the use of evidence either. An implicit ban in 
the constitution’s article on the protection privacy was ruled out, because it 
was the intention of its framers to strive for maximal coherence between the 
fundamental rights protection under the Belgian constitution and that under 
the ECHR; see also: Constitutional Court 27 July 2011, n. 139/2011. 
40 Art. 13 of the Statute of 9 December 2004 concerning mutual assistance in 
criminal matters, Official Bulletin 24 December 2004.
41 See in the same sense: Court of Cassation decision of 12 October 2005, AR 
P.05.0119.F., JT 2006, 109, JLMB 2006, 585, Pas. 2005, 1904, Rev.dr.pén. 2006, 
211, T.Strafr. 2006, 25, with comment by F. Verbruggen. By introducing art. 
32 PT CCP, the legislator explicitly wanted to codify the existing case law of 
the Court of Cassation. (Parl. St., Kamer, B.Z. 2010, DOC 53-0041/001, p. 3 
and Parl. St., Kamer, 2012-2013, DOC 53-0041/002, pp. 2-3).
42 E. Maes, “Onrechtmatig verkregen bewijs en het integriteitsprincipe in het 
voorstel voor een nieuw Strafwetboek”, NC 2020, 499.
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procedural errors and a perception – not really backed up by empirical 
examples – that many guilty persons would profit from the strict rules 
on procedural errors while their interests have not really been harmed.43 
Neither the judiciary, nor the legislative body ever really addressed the 
issue that poorly drafted and incoherent legislation on procedural rules 
may be a cause of law enforcement authorities’ errors. Commentators 
pointed out that this remarkable leniency towards sloppy law enforcement 
and the judiciary stands in contrast to the increasingly strict application 
of procedural rules with regards to suspects and defendants, e.g. with 
regards to procedural deadlines and formalities.44
2. stAtutory nullIty 
The CCP hardly ever provides nullity as a sanction for failing to meet 
a procedural formality (infra). There always has been much case law on the 
‘exclusionary/admissibility rule’ and the legislation concerning procedures 
for intrusive investigative measures has become ever more detailed and 
extensive. That makes it all the more striking how little legislative attention 
has been paid to the appropriate sanction for illegally obtained evidence. To 
a certain extent this can be explained by the fact that, originally, the code’s 
drafters assumed that including procedural formalities in statute law was 
sufficient to guarantee the respect thereof. It appeared self-evident that 
what happened outside of the bounds of the law, would be inadmissible in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.45 This is why the CCP did not contain 
the initial ‘exclusionary rule’ and furthermore seldom explicitly provides 
nullity as a sanction for failing to meet a procedural formality.46 Nullity 
sanctions were included to stress that a certain requirement was important 
43 Parl. St., Kamer, B.Z. 2010, DOC 53-0041/001, p. 3.
44 F. Verbruggen, “Voorwoord (Preface)” in J. Huysmans, ‘Legitieme verdedig-
ing’ (Legitimate defence), Antwerp, Intersentia, 2017, v. 
45 B. De Smet, “Stromingen in het stelsel van nietigheden. Nieuwe criteria voor 
de uitsluiting van onrechtmatig verkregen bewijs”, T.Strafr. 2005, (248) 249, 
who refers to F. Hélie, Traité de l’instruction criminelle, Brussels, Bruylant, 
1863, III, 766.
46 S. De Decker, F. Verbruggen, “Across the River and Into the Poisonous 
Trees. From exclusion to the Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in Criminal 
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even though it could at first sight appear to be rather trivial.47 Since the 
U-turn in the case law in 2003, Parliament has included only few nullity 
sanctions in the CCP (infra), because nullity leaves absolutely no margin 
for appreciation for the judge. Lawmakers seem unwilling to take a stance 
and prefer to leave it to the judges to balance the interests at stake. For the 
same reason, one of the few nullity sanctions which was provided by law 
(in relation to the wiretap, which was introduced in 1993 with quite some 
reluctance and distrust towards law enforcement at the time) has been 
abolished in 2016.48 Parliament indeed considered that the consequences of 
the nullity sanction were too dramatic and disproportionate in the serious 
cases for which wiretaps are used.49
It should be noted, however, that case law did develop a category 
of so-called “substantial formalities”. Although not accompanied by a 
statutory nullity sanction, judges considered those formalities nevertheless 
to be essential. Would a violation of said formalities lead to exclusion 
of evidence? Following a Court of Cassation decision of 16 November 
2004, it did not seem to be relevant whether a formality was considered 
substantial or not. The consequences of a violation of said formality had 
to be assessed in the same manner.50 This therefore seemed to make the 
distinction between substantial and non-substantial formalities practically 
irrelevant. However, in 2013 the Court of Cassation did accept that a 
breach of a specific category of substantial formalities should lead to 
the exclusion of evidence: those relating to the organisation of courts 
Proceedings in Belgium”, in The XIIIth World Congress of Procedural Law: the 
Belgian and Dutch Reports, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2008, 66.
47 Report on behalf of the committee, Parl.St. Kamer 2012-13, n. 53K0041/003, 
60; C. Conings, Klassiek en digitaal speuren naar strafrechtelijk bewijs, Ant-
werp, Intersentia, 2017, 374-375.
48 Art. 66 of the Statute of 5 February 2016 amending criminal law and criminal 
procedure and laying down various provisions on justice, Official Bulletin 19 
February 2016.
49 Explanatory Memorandum, Parl.St. Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54K1418/001, 62.
50 Court of Cassation decision of 16 November 2004, AR P.04.0644.N., RABG 
2005, 504, RW 2005-06, 387, with comment by P. Populier, T.Strafr. 2005, 
285, with comment by R.Verstraeten and S. De Decker, Vigiles (N) 2004 (ex-
cerpt), 171, with comment by F. Schuermans, confirmed in Court of Cassa-
tion decision of 15 November 2005, AR P.05.1275.N. 
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and tribunals.51 The case concerned a home search which was mandated 
by a judge who did not have the power to authorise those searches.52 
Though it seemed like an important correction, this case law was explicitly 
abandoned when Parliament introduced art. 32 PT CCP.53 Later case law 
confirmed that even in case of a breach of substantial formalities relating 
to the organisation of courts and tribunals, no exception applies.54
Whether judges consider a procedural safeguard to be substantial 
or not, has therefore become irrelevant. Only the violation of legal 
requirements explicitly accompanied by a statutory nullity sanction will 
automatically lead to exclusion of the evidence obtained. The sanction 
of nullity is currently only linked to some specific requirements for the 
seizure of real estate (art. 35bis CCP), testimony by a witness granted full 
51 Court of Cassation decision of 24 April 2013, AR P.12.1919.F, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2013:CONC.20130424.3, JT 2013, n. 6524, 416, concl. D. Vander-
meersch, with comment by L.Kennes, RABG 2013, n. 14, 1013, concl. . D. 
Vandermeersch, with comment by V. Vereecke, T. Strafr. 2013, n. 6, 382, 
with comment. As implicitly introduced in Court of Cassation decision of 26 
January 2013, AR P.10.1321.F, ECLI:BE:CASS:2011:ARR.20110126.4, RDPC 
2012, n. 1, 82, with comment by D. Dillenbourg, T. Strafr. 2011, n. 4, 268, 
with comment by F. Schuermans. 
52 See as well: C Conings, Klassiek en digitaal speuren naar strafrechtelijk bewijs, 
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2017, 26 and 370.
53 Report on behalf of the committee, Parl.St. Kamer 2012-13, n. 53K0041/010, 
4-6; Report on behalf of the committee, Parl.St. Kamer 2012-13, n. 
53K0041/015, 3-4. See as well: M.A. Beernaert “Les princesses de l’hôtel 
Conrad et la loi Antigone” (comment to Court of Cassation decision of 23 
September 2015), JLMB 2016, n. 16, (762) 763; C. Conings, Klassiek en digi-
taal speuren naar strafrechtelijk bewijs, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2017, 372. 
54 Court of Cassation decision of 10 June 2014, AR P.14.0282.N, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2014:ARR.20140610.4, NC 2015, 196, with comment by B. Verstraeten, 
P. Vermoote, T.Strafr. 2015, n. 4-5, 227, with comment by L.Delbrouck, K. 
Truyen; Court of Cassation decision of 23 September 2015, AR P.14.0238.F, 
ECLI:BE:CASS:2015:CONC.20150923.4, RDPC 2016, n. 1, 72. See as well: 
M.A. Beernaert, “Les princesses de l’hôtel Conrad et la loi Antigone” (com-
ment to Court of Cassation decision of 23 September 2015), JLMB 2016, n. 
16, 762-764); L.Delbrouck, K. Truyen, “Artikel 32 V.T.Sv.: meer dan een lout-
ere facelift” (comment to Cass. 10 June 2014), T.Strafr. 2015, n. 4-5, (228) 
229-230; P. Vanwalleghem, “Antigoon geldt ook voor wettelijk geregeld be-
wijs”, De Juristenkrant 2014, n. 292, (7) 7. B. Verstraeten, P. Vermoote, “De 
onderzoeksrechter buiten saisine: een (proactieve) cowboy?” (comment to 
Court of Cassation decision of 10 June 2014), NC 2015, (197) 203.
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anonymity (art. 86bis and 86ter CCP) and when performing a polygraph 
test as of 1 January 2021 (new version of art. 112duodecies CCP which 
should take effect on said date). 
Furthermore, statute law provides for an explicit sanction when 
statements are made during questioning which infringes the rules on 
questioning in violation of the right to legal assistance. Art. 47bis in fine CCP 
stipulates that no person can be convicted based on statements he made 
in breach of the right to and rules on prior confidential consultations and 
the assistance of a lawyer during questioning. This is, however, not strict 
nullity: such statements can for instance be used to convict third persons.
3. unrelIAbIlIty of evIdence becAuse of the IllegAlIty
As a second rule, judges must exclude illegally obtained evidence 
when the irregularity taints its reliability. Of course, judges always take 
reliability into account, also when assessing the probative value of legally 
obtained evidence. However, when the judge assesses the probative value 
of legally obtained evidence, unreliable evidence will not be ‘excluded’ 
in the strict sense of the word, i.e. it will not be declared inadmissible. 
Rather, the judge will simply decide not to rely on said evidence in 
deciding upon the defendant’s guilt.
A prime example of evidence that may be unreliable as a result 
of the way in which it was gathered, is evidence that is dependent on 
the free will of the person providing it, notably witness statements and 
confessions. The reliability could clearly be tainted by illicit pressure or 
influence from the police.55 However, also other types of evidence can 
be unreliable due to irregularities. DNA tests for instance are regulated 
in detail.56 A violation of these rather technical regulations may just as 
well affect the reliability of the test results.57 
55 S. De Decker, F. Verbruggen, “Across the River and Into the Poisonous Trees. 
From exclusion to the Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in Criminal Pro-
ceedings in Belgium”, in The XIIIth World Congress of Procedural Law: the 
Belgian and Dutch Reports, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2008, 76-77. 
56 Royal Decree 4 February 2002, Official Bulletin 30 March 2002.
57 S. De Decker, F. Verbruggen, “Across the River and Into the Poisonous 
Trees. From exclusion to the Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in Criminal 
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4. vIolAtIon of the rIght to A fAIr trIAl 
The third ground for exclusion is the most important one in 
practice. The Court of Cassation has set out a number of criteria to 
determine whether evidence obtained in an irregular manner must be 
excluded to ensure the right to a fair trial.58 It confirmed these criteria 
after the introduction of art. 32 PT CCP.59 In the assessment, the judge 
may in particular take into account:
 ▪ the intentional or inexcusable nature of the rule-breaking 
by the investigators,60 
 ▪ the seriousness of the irregularity in comparison to the se-
riousness of the offence under investigation,61
Proceedings in Belgium”, in The XIIIth World Congress of Procedural Law: the 
Belgian and Dutch Reports, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2008, 76-77. 
58 Court of Cassation decision of 23 March 2004, AR P.04.0012.N, RABG 2004, 
1061, with comment by F. Schuermans; Court of Cassation decision of 12 
October 2005, AR P.05.0119.F., JT 2006, 109,  JLMB 2006, 585,  Pas. 2005, 
1904, Rev.dr.pén. 2006, 211, T.Strafr. 2006, 25, with comment by F. Verbrug-
gen; Court of Cassation decision of 31 October 2006, AR P.06.1016.N, T.Strafr. 
2007, n. 1, 53, with comment by F. Schuermans and comment by J. Van Gaev-
er; Court of Cassation decision of 23 September 2008, AR P.08.0519.N, T.Stra-
fr. 2009, n. 3, 151, noot F. Schuermans; Court of Cassation decision of 5 June 
2012, AR P.11.2100.N, ECLI:BE:CASS:2012:ARR.20120605.5, NC 2013, 439, 
with comment; Court of Cassation decision of 28 May 2013, AR P.13.0066.N, 
ECLI:BE:CASS:2013:CONC.20130528.9, RABG 2014, n. 1, 29, with comment 
by V. Vereecke, RW 2013-14, n. 41, 1616, with comment by B. De Smet
59 Court of Cassation decision of 5 January 2016, AR P.15.1103.N, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2016:ARR.20160105.7, RW 2015-16, 1.
60 Beernaert writes that the question whether the violation of the rules hap-
pened intentionally or not, might be relevant when deciding on disciplinary 
sanctions for those who broke the rules, but should not be decisive to deter-
mine what should happen to illegally gathered evidence. (M. Beernaert, “La 
preuve en matière pénale: principes généraux”, in: Droit pénal et procédure 
pénale, Bruges, La Charte, looseleaf, (1) 20, n.43.) Maes convincingly re-
sponds that, to the extent that the exclusionary rule aims at underpinning 
the integrity of the criminal justice system, it does matter: intentional misbe-
haviour does justify a stronger reaction from the judge. (E. Maes, “Onrecht-
matig verkregen bewijs en het integriteitsprincipe in het voorstel voor een 
nieuw Strafwetboek”, NC 2020, 496).
61 Court of Cassation decision of 12 June 2019, n.. P.18.1001.F, Rev. dr. pén. 
entr., 2019, 289, ECLI:BE:CASS:2019:ARR.20190612.1: the rights of the 
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 ▪ the fact that the illegally obtained evidence only relates to a 
material element of the existence of the offence, and not to the 
involvement of a specific person in committing the offence,
 ▪ that fact that the irregularity is of a purely formal nature,
 ▪ the impact of the irregularity on the freedom or right that 
the violated norm is intended to protect.
This list is not exhaustive. The Court of Cassation also refers 
to the respect police forces had for the loyalty principle enshrined 
in the CCP as a factor that judges can take into consideration in the 
exercise of their discretion.62 On several occasions, it has also taken 
into account circumstances which cast doubt on the reliability of 
the evidence obtained because of concerns as to the impartiality of 
the person who conducted the investigation.63 This consideration 
differs from the second ground for exclusion because it need not be 
established that the reliability of the evidence has indeed been tainted. 
The fact that circumstances cast serious doubt on the reliability of 
the evidence suffices to conclude that its use would lead to a breach 
of the right to a fair trial. 
The criteria are indicative, they are not binding, nor is any 
single one of them decisive. For instance, the fact that law enforcement 
agencies committed the irregularity intentionally does not necessarily 
defence can be balanced with the interest of society when assessing whether 
the trial is fair: Court of Cassation decision of 30 April 2014, n. P.13.1869.F. 
ECLI:BE:CASS:2014:ARR.20140430.2. 
62 Court of Cassation decision of 5 November 2014, AR P.14.1170.F, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2014:ARR.20141105.4 . 
63 Court of Cassation decision of 25 October 2016, AR P.15.0593.N, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2016:ARR.20161025.5; Court of Cassation decision of 12 June 2019, 
AR P.18.1001.F, ECLI:BE:CASS:2019:ARR.20190612.1.  See in the same 
sense: ECtHR 19 February 2019, n. 25253/08, Ruşen Bayar/Turkey: “The 
Court reiterates that in determining whether the proceedings as a whole were fair, 
regard must be had to whether the rights of the defence have been respected, in 
particular whether the applicant was given the opportunity of challenging the 
admissibility and authenticity of the evidence and of opposing its use (see Pano-
vits v. Cyprus, no. 4268/04, § 82, 11 December 2008). In addition, the quality 
of the evidence must be taken into consideration, including whether the circum-
stances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy.”
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lead to exclusion of the resulting evidence.64 The judge should take into 
account all the elements of the case to decide whether the use of the 
illegally obtained evidence would be contrary to the right to a fair trial. 
As a general rule, the judge is, however, not obliged to include all of 
the abovementioned criteria in the assessment and is free to use other 
criteria.65 In a 2018 decision, the Court of Cassation seemed to imply that 
in the assessment the judge must include the criteria that the parties to 
the proceedings have raised.66 In the same sense, the European Court of 
Human Rights has ruled that the right to a fair trial presupposes effective 
judicial control. The suspect must therefore be given the opportunity to 
challenge the admissibility and authenticity of the evidence. However, 
this possibility should not be purely theoretical and illusory. The judge 
must take a concrete position on the arguments raised and provide an 
appropriate response to the crucial points raised.67 
64 Court of Cassation decision of 31 October 2006, AR P.06.1016.N, T.Strafr. 
2007, n. 1, 53, with comment by F. Schuermans and comment by J. Van Gaever.
65 See by way of example: Court of Cassation decision of 31 October 2006, 
AR P.06.1016.N, T.Strafr. 2007, n. 1, 53, with comment by F. Schuermans 
and comment by J. Van Gaever.; Court of Cassation decision of 5 June 2012, 
AR P.11.2100.N, ECLI:BE:CASS:2012:ARR.20120605.5, NC 2013, 439, with 
comment; Court of Cassation decision of 28 May 2013, AR P.13.0066.N, 
ECLI:BE:CASS:2013:CONC.20130528.9, RABG 2014, n. 1, 29, with comment 
by V. Vereecke, RW 2013-14, n. 41, 1616, with comment by B. De Smet; 
C. Conings, Klassiek en digitaal speuren naar strafrechtelijk bewijs, Antwerp, 
Intersentia, 2017, 367-368; T. Decaigny, “Bever, beroepsgeheim en bewijs” 
(comment to Court of Cassation decision 9 May 2007), T.Strafr. 2008, n. 2, 
(98) 100; B. De Smet, “Criteria en subcriteria voor de beoordeling van onre-
gelmatigheden inzake de bewijsverkrijging” (comment to Court of Cassation 
decision 28 May 2013), RW 2013-14, (1620) 1624; P.Vanwalleghem, “Anti-
goon redt Kelkbewijs niet”, Juristenkrant 2013, n. 272, 1 and 7; R.Verstraeten, 
S. De Decker, “Antigoon sluit de achterpoort, maar opent een raam” (com-
ment to Court of Cassation decision 16 November 2004), T.Strafr. 2005, n. 6, 
(289) 290.
66 A contrario reasoning based on the Court of Cassation decision 9 January 
2018, AR P.17.0411.N, ECLI:BE:CASS:2018:ARR.20180109.3, VAV 2018, n. 
2, 12, with comment by L. Brewaeys: “It follows that, in the absence of a written 
submission to that effect, the court is not required, when assessing whether the 
use of evidence is contrary to the right to a fair trial, to consider all those criteria.”
67 ECtHR. 19 February 2019, n. 25253/08, Ruşen Bayar/Turkey.
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Whereas the broad, non-decisive and non-exhaustive criteria 
seem to leave a wide judicial discretion when assessing whether the right 
to a fair trial is breached, in practice it is mainly used to deny there is 
such a breach.68 Evidence is almost never excluded in court nowadays.69 
5. fruIts of the PoIsonous tree
The Court of Cassation has always stood by the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine”: if the conditions for exclusion are fulfilled, this 
entails not only that the original illegally obtained evidence but also its 
fruits must be excluded.70 If the original illegal action is covered by any 
of the three grounds for compulsory exclusion, judges cannot take into 
consideration “neither directly nor indirectly” any evidence found as a 
consequence of the original error. Nonetheless, both national judges71 and 
68 Critical about this practice and the absence of a fundamental debate on the 
‘balancing act’ of courts: L. Kennes, “L’impertinente Antigone ou le défaut 
de pertinence du critère d’équité pour décider de l’exclusion d’une preuve 
irrégulière”, Journal des Tribunaux, 2018, 2-9 and F. Kuty, “La nullité d’un élé-
ment de preuve pour contravention au caractère équitable de la procédure. 
L’essoufflement de l’article 6 de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de 
l’homme et des libertés fondamentales”, Liber amicorum Patrick Henry, Brux-
elles, Larcier, 2019, 15-43. 
69 The Antigoon doctrine which had its origin in criminal procedure, even made 
its way into other branches of law: J. Van Doninck, Het lot van onrechtmatig 
bewijs (The faith of illegal evidence), Antwerp, Intersentia, 2020, xvi + 380 p. 
Some lower labour law courts are resisting pressure from the Court of Cassa-
tion to extend the Antigoon-case law to social law matters (conflicts between 
employers and workers, dismissal cases): see on illegal GPS-monitoring of 
workers, which was excluded by the lower court: K. Rosier, “Illégalité d’un 
système de traçage G.P.S. et preuve irrégulière”, JLMB 2020, 1353-1356.
70 Court of Cassation decision of 16 June 1987, Arr. Cass. 1986-87, nr 627; 
Court of Cassation decision of 22 May 2001, T. Strafr. 2002, 36; Court of 
Cassation decision of 30 March 2010, T. Strafr. 2010, 276, with comment by 
K.Beirnaert K. Beirnaert.
71 Court of Cassation decision of 15 January 2019, n. P.18.0790.N, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2019:ARR.20190115.3, Pasicrisie Belge 2019, 84-87: a final decision by a 
court had found that a search was illegal. Defendants alleged that the wiretap in 
their separate case had been based on this illegal initial search and should be con-
sidered illegal, too. In vain: the courts decided that there had been enough other 
elements to justify the wiretap warrant and refused to declare it null and void.
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the European Court of Human Rights72 have accepted that ‘other evidence’ 
was unrelated to the illegally gathered evidence, that metaphorically it was 
‘fruit of a different tree’ and that the unrelated evidence was sufficient to 
found a conviction. The decisions on pre-trial preventive detention also 
seem to be ‘a different tree’: the Court of Cassation stresses that illegally 
gathered information can73 and often even should74 be used by judges 
deciding on the arrest or the continued detention on remand of suspects.
6. whIch judge cAn or must exclude the IllegAl evIdence?
Under the existing CCP, which provides for two types of criminal 
investigation (preliminary investigation and judicial inquiry), the moment 
in the procedure at which the evidence will be excluded may differ. At 
the end of the judicial inquiry, the so-called pre-trial chambers (like the 
Chamber of Indictment of the Court of Appeals) should eliminate the 
illegally gathered evidence (art. 235bis CCP). The idea was to avoid that 
the trial judge would still be psychologically influenced by the evidence 
he is supposed to ignore. However, if the issue has not been raised in 
the pre-trial stage, it will still be possible to raise it at the actual trial. 
Furthermore, the Court of Cassation has suggested that exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence by the pre-trial chambers is only possible in 
case of nullity or violation of the right to a fair trial. The second ground, 
unreliability caused by the irregularity of the gathering, cannot be judged 
72 E.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 1 June 2010, n. 22978, Gäfgen/Germany.
73 The mere fact that an irregularity has been committed at the opening of the 
inquiry does not necessarily mean that it has emptied the rights of defense 
of the accused of their very substance. It does not follow from any legal or 
treaty provision that serious indications of guilt gathered during an irregular 
search must necessarily be excluded by the judge in charge of the control on 
the preventive detention, nor that this judge cannot decide to take them into 
consideration. (Court of Cassation decision of 29 May 2019, n. P.19.0546.F, 
ECLI:BE:CASS:2019:ARR.20190529.4).
74 The fact that the user of a call number has been identified in violation of Ar-
ticle 46bis CCP does not authorise the pre-trial chambers, ruling on preven-
tive detention, to disregard this information, except in the three cases where 
Article 32 PT CCP provides for such a sanction. (Court of Cassation decision 
of 6 February 2019, n. P.19.0097.F, ECLI:BE:CASS:2019:ARR.20190206.3)
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by the pre-trial chambers, as it requires an assessment of the probative 
value of the evidence and this is not their task. It should be left to the 
trial judge.75 Regardless, the overwhelming majority of investigations are 
preliminary investigations conducted by the public prosecutor, which are 
not subject to the supervision of the pre-trial chambers, so any decision 
on exclusion or admission of illegally gathered evidence will be taken 
by the trial court. There is an important exception, though: if so-called 
special investigative methods have been used (undercover agents, secret 
visual surveillance, but not wiretap or covert search in IT-systems) the 
pre-trial Indictment Chamber will perform a control of legality even after 
a preliminary investigation (art. 235ter CCP). The pre-trial proceedings 
are not open to the public and the procedure is organised in such a way 
as to allow judicial control without revealing too much about the methods 
and technical means used or the identity of the people involved in the 
covert police operations.
7. no exclusIon of exculPAtory evIdence76 
In one situation illegally gathered evidence is always admissible: 
if the evidence is exculpatory, suspects can always rely on it.77 It does not 
matter whether suspects or defendants were personally involved in the 
illegal actions or not.78 For instance, when a witness statement containing 
some exculpatory information is illegal (e.g. violation of the public nature 
of the court sessions), the suspect can use the information in his defence 
75 Court of Cassation decision of 3 April 2012, Pasicrisie 2012, 745; Court of 
Cassation decision of 19 May 2015, AR P.14.0921.N, T. Strafr. 2015, 261; in 
Court of Cassation decision of 4 April 2017, n. P.16.0351.N. it clarified that 
even if the pre-trial judge found the reliability was no problem, parties can 
still raise this issue before the trial judge, who is free to decide on the matter.
76 S. De Decker, F. Verbruggen, “Across the River and Into the Poisonous Trees. 
From exclusion to the Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in Criminal Pro-
ceedings in Belgium”, in The XIIIth World Congress of Procedural Law: the 
Belgian and Dutch Reports, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2008, 72-73.
77 Court of Cassation decision of 12 November 1997, Rev.dr.pén. 1998, 586.
78 R.Verstraeten, Handboek strafvordering (Companion to criminal procedure), 
Antwerp, Maklu, 2007, no. 1739, 870.
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all the same.79 As it happens, evidence which is exculpatory for one of the 
suspects can indeed be quite damaging for another suspect. Judges will 
have to consider it in favour of the former, but ignore it when dealing 
with the latter. That is easier said than done.
v.  no hElp froM abovE: acquiEscEncE froM thE EuropEan 
courts
The Court of Cassation took the initiative to admit illegally 
gathered evidence routinely and exclude it only rarely. The new rule 
was subsequently written into the CCP by the Belgian Parliament and 
unsuccessfully challenged before the Belgian Constitutional Court. Hence, 
opponents who hoped to reverse or mitigate the current rule, could only 
attempt to challenge it at the European level. However, the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has always been reluctant to meddle 
with member state rules on evidence. It has held that – at least for very 
serious offences and if the defendant had been given enough opportunity 
to challenge it – the Belgian practice did not violate the ECHR.80
A new front was opened, when in 2015 the European Union’s 
Court of Justice in Luxembourg (hereinafter: CJEU) surprised everyone 
by stating in its WebMindLicenses Kft-judgement that if rules of EU law, 
including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, have been violated in 
the collection of evidence, the principle of effectiveness of Union law 
requires that member state judges exclude the evidence.81 This prompted 
the Belgian Constitutional Court to ask for clarification in a preliminary 
question’: if the CJEU found that Belgian rules on the compulsory retention 
of metadata by telecom and internet service providers for subsequent 
access and use by law enforcement (ICT traffic and location data) violated 
79 Court of Cassation decision of 3 November 1999, T.Strafr. 2000, 255, with 
comment by J. Meese.
80 First the Antigoon case law (ECtHR 28 July 2009, n. 18704, Lee Davies/
Belgium.), subsequently art.32 PT CCP (ECtHR 31 January 2017, n. 
40233/07, Kalneniene/Belgium, T.Strafr. 2017, 112, with comment by C. 
Van De Heyning.)
81 European Court of Justice 17 December 2015, Case C-419/14, ECLI:EU:C: 
2015:832, §§ 68 and 86-89.
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the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, did that create an obligation for 
Belgian judges to exclude all evidence resulting from such access and 
use of the data?82 Could at least past cases be saved in which it had been 
assumed – wrongly, as it turned out – that the practice was not illegal 
under EU law? 
In its somewhat sibylline judgement of 6 October 2020, the CJEU 
adopted a strict approach regarding the (il)legality, but a mild one regarding 
the use of illegal evidence.83 Under the principle of primacy of EU law 
over national law, the CJEU claims the exclusive right to set temporary 
limits on the effect of any illegality, “in exceptional cases, on the basis of 
overriding considerations of legal certainty, allow the temporary suspension 
of the ousting effect of a rule of EU law with respect to national law that is 
contrary thereto”.84 National (constitutional) courts are not entitled to set 
temporal limits on a declaration of illegality and in this case the CJEU 
itself refused to do it. The Court was more flexible, however, with respect 
to the subsequent “use in criminal proceedings, of information and evidence 
obtained as a result of the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic 
and location data” in breach of EU law. According to the CJEU, as EU law 
currently stands, “it is for member state national law alone to determine the 
rules relating to the admissibility and assessment, in criminal proceedings 
against persons suspected of having committed serious criminal offences, of 
information and evidence obtained by such retention of data contrary to EU 
law”.85 It is remarkable that the CJEU only seems to refer to said national 
autonomy in relation to proceedings concerning ‘serious criminal offences’. 
The Court therefor still leaves the question open whether a breach of EU 
82 Constitutional Court 19 July 2018, n. 96/2018; Cfr. F.Verbruggen, S.Royer, H.
Severijns, “Reconsidering the blanket-data-retention-taboo, for human rights’ 
sake? Belgian Constitutional Court offers CJEU chance to explain its puzzling 
Tele2 Sverige AB-decision”, EULawblog 1 October 2018: https://europeanlaw-
blog.eu/2018/10/01/reconsidering-the-blanket-data-retention-taboo-for-hu-
man-rights-sake/
83 European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) 6 October 2020, Joined Cases 
C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791.
84 European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) 6 October 2020, Joined Cases 
C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791, § 216.
85 European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) 6 October 2020, Joined Cases 
C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791, § 222.
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law in relation to a less serious offence should indeed lead to exclusion 
of the illegally obtained evidence further to the principle of effectiveness 
of EU law. The CJEU furthermore stresses that the EU law principle of 
effectiveness, may be achieved “not only by prohibiting the use of such 
information and evidence, but also by means of national rules and practices 
governing the assessment and weighing of such material, or by factoring in 
whether that material is unlawful when determining the sentence.”86 However, 
the CJEU omits to clarify under what circumstances the illegality should 
at least affect the weight of the evidence or sentence to be imposed. For 
Belgium, article 32 PT CCP denies the trial judges the right to exclude the 
evidence, but is silent about taking the illegality into account in weighing 
the evidence or at sentencing. The CJEU warns that the evidence should 
nevertheless be excluded from criminal proceedings if the suspects “are 
not in a position to comment effectively on that information and that evidence 
and they pertain to a field of which the judges have no knowledge and are 
likely to have a preponderant influence on the findings of fact.”87 This does 
not seem to differ from the existing Belgian exclusionary rule if the right 
to a fair trial would be affected.
vi. altErnativE ways to sanction invEstigativE MisbEhaviour 
In extreme cases of investigative misbehaviour, judges can opt 
for the ultimate procedural sanction: the inadmissibility of the criminal 
proceedings as a whole.88 In Belgium this ‘sledge hammer’ is rarely used89, 
86 European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) 6 October 2020, Joined Cases 
C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791, § 225.
87 European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) 6 October 2020, Joined Cases 
C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791, §§ 226-227.
88 Court of Cassation decision of 12 June 2019, P.18.1001.F.
89 Court of Cassation decision of 10 February 2016, P.15.1505.F, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2016:ARR.20160210.5, Rev. dr. pén. 2016, 841; Court of Cassation deci-
sion of 12 June 2019, P.18.1001.F, ECLI:BE:CASS:2019:ARR.20190612.1. The 
Court of Cassation has made it very difficult for trial courts to use this sanc-
tion. It stated that “as a rule, the sanction for the irregularity of evidence does 
not consist in the inadmissibility of the public action, but in the obligation for the 
judge to set aside the irregular elements and then to base his decision only on the 
other elements of evidence that may exist, insofar as they have been obtained in 
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mainly in cases of extreme bad faith of the investigators90 and of police 
provocation (entrapment). Offences are provoked if the intention to 
commit the offence was generated or reinforced – or endorsed when 
the suspect no longer wanted to commit the offence – by a police officer 
or a third person acting at the request of the police.91 The Court of 
Cassation stressed that judges cannot base the inadmissibility on “the 
sole circumstance that a rule relating to the administration of proof, the 
disregard of which is sanctioned criminally, has not been complied with; it 
a regular manner without simply stemming from the irregular elements or being 
inseparably linked to them; on the other hand, the judge may only declare the 
public action inadmissible if it is established that, despite having set aside the 
irregular evidence, it remains absolutely impossible for the court to decide on the 
admissibility of the public action with respect for the right to a fair trial guaran-
teed by Article 6 ECHR.” (F. Kuty, N. Colette-Basecqz, E. Delhaise, O. Neder-
landt, H.D. Bosly, L. Kennes, D. Vandermeersch, “Chronique semestrielle de 
jurisprudence 2020/1”, Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, 2020, 582, re-
ferring to Court of Cassation decision of 20 November 2018, AR P.18.0688.N, 
ECLI:BE:CASS:2018:ARR.20181120.5, Rechtskundig Weekblad 2018-2019, 
1661.See also: L. Kennes, and D. Holzapfel, “La déloyauté d’un enquêteur 
peut justifier l’écartement des procès-verbaux rédigés par celui-ci sans pour 
autant impliquer l’irrecevabilité des poursuites”, JLMB 2020, 1468-1477.
90 Inadmissibility should be used when the investigation has been disloy-
al from the outset, the rights of defence of the suspect repeatedly violated 
seriously and definitively and the defendants have been irremediably de-
prived of their right to a fair trial. (Court of Appeals Brussels 10 Decem-
ber 2010, JT 2011, 54.) It would also be pronounced if the judicial inquiry 
has been completely coloured by the partiality of the investigating judge. 
Cfr.: Court of Cassation decision of 31 May 2011, AR P.10.2037.F, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2011:ARR.20110531.1, JT 2011, 583, opinion J. Genicot, with com-
ment by M.A. Beernaert, JLMB 2011, 1524, with comment by A. De Nauw; 
cfr also K. Beirnaert, “Het recht van verdediging en de onmogelijkheid de 
regelmatigheid van de procedure te controleren: staat de ontvankelijkheid 
van de strafvordering niet op het spel?” (comment on Court of Cassation 
decision of 30 March 2010), T.Strafr. 2010, 277-281. Y. Liègeois and B. De 
Smet, “Twintig jaar zuivering van nietigheden tijdens het gerechtelijk onderzoek. 
Tijd voor verandering of opfrissing van het systeem”, RW 2019-20, 8 point out: 
“In some cases it is impossible to filter the illegally obtained elements from the ev-
idence and to continue the procedure without them. Then the judge must declare 
the prosecution inadmissible if the first link of the procedural chain is compro-
mised. If an offense is detected by the use of techniques which are incompatible 
with the law or general principles of law, there is no evidence for the judge to use.”
91 Art. 30 PT CCP.
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is not otherwise when the irregular proof constitutes the sole or determining 
basis for the identification of the offender.”92
Furthermore, the person who gathered the evidence may be 
criminally liable. This depends on the nature of the illegal action. If the 
conduct is punishable by law (e.g. conducting a search or a wiretap 
without a warrant is a criminal offence), this person can be prosecuted. 
Sometimes the identity of persons is protected by law (informers and 
undercover agents: art. 47octies and art. 47decies CCP). Although the public 
prosecution service can reveal their identity if crimes were committed, 
it cannot be forced to do so by judges, if it decides the identity should be 
protected. Belgium is probably unique in the world, in the sense that any 
public authority can incur criminal liability (article 5 Criminal Code). 
That includes the federal state: it could be held criminally liable for the 
behaviour of investigators, prosecutors or judges. 
Persons who have been unfairly dealt with, can also hold the state 
liable under tort law for any loss that the illegal evidence gathering has 
caused them. They will have to demonstrate the causal relation between 
the illegal evidence and their material or moral loss before a civil court 
(art. 1382 Civil Code).
vii.  potEntial usE of illEgally obtainEd EvidEncE in thE 
fraMEwork of out of court sEttlEMEnts 
The prosecution can also propose to solve the case out of court, by 
way of financial settlement or mediation.93 Since out of court settlements 
always require the suspect’s consent, a suspect who believes that the 
prosecution service has based its case on illegal evidence which should 
be excluded, can refuse to accept. However, as most of the times illegal 
evidence can still be used, there is nothing that would prevent its use to 
convince a suspect to accept a settlement. Indeed, by making generous 
settlement offers to suspects, the prosecutors can avoid judicial scrutiny 
of rule breaking in the course of the preliminary investigation. Judges do 
92 Court of Cassation decision of 23 January 2019, P.18.0623.F, ECLI:BE:-
CASS:2019:ARR.20190123.12 . 
93 Articles 216bis and 216ter CCP.
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have to validate the settlement if a judicial inquiry has been initiated or 
if the case was already pending before the criminal court. 
viii. final rEMarks94
Privileging material truth-finding and punishment of perpetrators 
over the procedural protection of individual rights, Belgium has made 
it very difficult for judges to exclude illegally gathered evidence.95 That 
this system seems compatible with European (human rights) law, does 
not mean there is no room for improvement. 
We do not advocate a return to the old strict exclusionary rule. 
There are good reasons to mitigate it, without the overcompensation 
of current Belgian law. The underlying rationale of the exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence has always been and remains that this sanction 
will have a dissuasive effect on overzealous police officers, prosecutors 
and perhaps even investigating judges. In real life this type of sanction 
may not reduce the unwanted behaviour as much as it would stimulate 
creativity in searching ways to avoid the sanction, e.g. ’evidence laundering’ 
by third parties.96 Moreover, the distance – both in terms of time and 
psychologically – between the illegal action and the potential exclusion 
of the evidence is considerable. Under Belgian criminal procedural law, 
the people behaving improperly during the investigation are rarely called 
to answer in person at the trial for their procedural misbehaviour. For 
unintentional, inadvertent breaking of the rules by investigators, one 
should not expect too much of a deterrent effect for exclusion as a 
94 This is on update of the analysis from: D. De Decker, F. Verbruggen, "Across 
the River and into the Poisonous Trees. From Exclusion to Use of Illegally 
Gathered Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in Belgium", in The XIIIth World 
Congress of Procedural Law: the Belgian and Dutch Reports, Antwerp, Inter-
sentia, 2008.
95 E. Cape, J. Hodgson, T. Prakken and T. Spronken, “Procedural rights at the 
investigative stage: towards a real commitment to minimal standards” in E. 
Cape, J. Hodgson, T. Prakken and T. Spronken (eds.), Suspects in Europe. 
Procedural rights at the investigative stage of criminal process in the European 
Union, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2007, (1) 14.
96 Supra III.1.From exclusion to admission.
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sanction. The biggest policy problem is that a consistent application 
of the exclusionary rule produces results which both practitioners and 
public opinion find hard to swallow. The exclusionary rule is mostly – or 
only – to the advantage of ’guilty’ suspects. When a case does not entail 
criminal proceedings, innocent persons whose rights were violated, will 
not benefit from this sanction. In conclusion, the exclusion of reliable, 
but illegally gathered evidence does not always sanction or reward the 
right persons. Sometimes admitting the evidence does make sense.97
The current Belgian system lacks coherence. On the one hand it 
is legalistic to the extreme, in the sense that it links obligatory exclusion 
to the violation of a formality for which statutes explicitly provide nullity. 
This is rather peculiar, as everyone knows that in Belgian statutory law 
such provisions are very rare. One could say the Court of Cassation 
passed the buck to Parliament, which should provide nullity for every 
formality which it deems essential. So far, the suggestion has fallen on 
deaf ears. On the other hand the current rules turn on the criterion of the 
right to a fair trial as a kind of panacea. The Belgian standards – which 
used to be relatively high – are reduced to the absolute minimum level 
of Strasbourg case law. As such, violations of the right to privacy do not 
entail an infringement on the right to a fair trial.98 Belgium took Strasbourg 
case law, which should be an absolute minimum states should never fall 
below, and turned it into the only standard and consequently into the 
maximum level of protection.99
97 See F. Verbruggen, “Vindt het spook van Antigoon rust? Franstalig 
“schoonmoedersarrest” als slotluik van de nieuwe cassatierechtspraak over 
de uitsluiting van onrechtmatig bewijs” (French-language “mother-in-law de-
cision” as the capstone for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Com-
ment on the Court of Cassation decision of 12 October 2005), T.Strafr. 2006, 
(26) 27-28.
98 ECtHR 12 May 2000, Khan / U.K.; ECtHR 25 September 2001, P.G. and J.H. / 
U.K.; ECtHR 5 November 2002, Allen / U.K.; ECtHR 9 December 2004, Van 
Rossem / Belgium. See for instance: Court of Cassation decision 19 April 
2016, P.15.1639.N, ECLI:BE:CASS:2016:ARR.20160419.3.
99 F. Verbruggen, “Vindt het spook van Antigoon rust? Franstalig “schoonmoeder-
sarrest” als slotluik van de nieuwe cassatierechtspraak over de uitsluiting van 
onrechtmatig bewijs” (French-language “mother-in-law decision” as the cap-
stone for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Comment on the Court 
of Cassation decision of 12 October 2005), T.Strafr. 2006, (26) 29-30.
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One can understand that the Belgian authorities are concerned that 
ever more detailed procedural rules in combination with more adversarial 
style defence tactics will lead to trials in which procedural discussions 
overshadow the merits and the substantive issues of criminal law. Is this 
a nostalgic longing for trials with debates centred more on the defendants 
and less on the investigators? Much as we appreciate this concern, we 
would like to warn against phobic traits in the judicial dislike of defence 
arguments related to procedural errors. Any pharmacologist knows that 
small doses of poison can sometimes be beneficial for an organism. Still, 
the Belgian criminal justice system’s appetite for poisoned fruit can be 
dangerous, if not lethal, in the long run. It is unduly lenient for sloppy 
performance and even for mischievous practices by investigators. 
Rather than the (individual or general) deterrence of investigators, 
it should be the overall image of the criminal justice as trustworthy and 
the exemplary ‘proper, lawful’ behaviour of those representing it, that 
should guide the legal regime for illegally gathered evidence. Like other 
authors, we have suggested that Parliament should make exclusion the 
rule again, but allow judges to use the evidence in a number of exceptional 
situations.100 Unlike now, investigators who infringe the rules should 
not be sure from the outset that their illegal actions will not affect the 
evidence and judges should explain why they do use evidence in spite 
of the fact that it was illegally gathered. 
Now that Belgium is finally getting rid of the Napoleonic CCP 
and considering the adoption of a new one, Parliament should grasp the 
opportunity to redress matters. Whether the proposal for a new CCP will 
eventually be adopted, remains to be seen.101 In any event, its drafters 
100 C.Conings, Klassiek en digitaal speuren naar strafrechtelijk bewijs (Classical 
and digital searches for criminal evidence), Antwerp- Cambridge, Intersentia, 
2017, 737 a.ff. and 760.
101 It involves abolition of the archaic, dysfunctional jury trial system, used only 
in 0,007 percent of cases, but politically a sacred cow. That common sense 
proposals are controversial in Belgium, is also apparent in the resistance 
against a single system of criminal investigation led by the prosecution ser-
vice under judicial control. The judge-inquisitor would disappear: whether 
or not investigators would be allowed to infringe fundamental rights would 
be decided by judges who are not conducting the investigation themselves. 
The spokespeople of the union of investigating judges are now actively 
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are intent on changing the rules on illegal evidence.102 Normality would 
be restored in the sense that legal rules must be followed and if they are 
not, as happens with illegally gathered evidence, the principle is that it 
should not be used à charge.103 The Drafting Committee is right in stressing 
that under the Rule of Law, a state cannot take as a norm that illegally 
gathered evidence should be used. Information gathered in violation 
of the rights of the defence, the right to privacy, the right to a private 
life, the integrity of persons, in violation of rules on the competence of 
judges and courts or in violation of the secrecy of journalistic sources, 
should be excluded, as well as information derived from it (‘fruit of the 
poisonous tree’ will be poisoned). 
However, the drafters do not envisage a return to the old strict 
exclusionary rule: judges will be allowed to make exceptions. They should 
consider the seriousness of the violation, the legal interest at stake and 
other circumstances of the specific case to allow the use when
1° it is not the result of an intentional and unjustifiable violation 
of the protected legal interest, 
2° the seriousness of the legal rule or interest that was affected 
in the specific case does not outweigh the interest of society 
in prosecuting the evidence and punishing the perpetrator and 
3° the use of the evidence is not detrimental to the integrity of 
the criminal justice system.
‘campaigning’ to keep the status quo with some minor changes. Belgian poli-
ticians, even though continuously talking about change and progress, tend to 
be very conservative in their approach of the country’s dysfunctional crim-
inal justice system.
102 The draft is not yet public, as the Bill is being scrutinised by the Coun-
cil of State. The main lines were already presented to Parliament at pub-
lic hearing and written down by the Committee’s co-ordinator, prof.dr. R. 
Verstraeten: Cfr. R.Verstraeten, A.Bailleux, “”Het voorstel van een nieuw 
Wetboek van strafvordering: algemene beginselen en fase van het onder-
zoek (The proposal for a new CCP: general principles and the investigation 
stage)”, in: Themis Straf- en strafprocesrecht, academiejaar 2018-19, Bruges, 
Die Keure 2019, 172-176. The text is said to have inspired a Bill proposed 
by individual Members of Parliament: https://www.dekamer.be/flwb/pd-
f/55/1239/55K1239001.pdf 
103 The existing principle that it can be used by the defence, i.e: à décharge, 
would be made explicit in statute law. Supra III.7. 
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In addition to this broad discretion to judge the appropriateness 
of excluding or using illegally gathered evidence, there are two instances 
in which judges have an absolute obligation to exclude. This would be 
more strict than the case law of the European Court of Human Rights104: 
evidence which results from inhuman and degrading treatment must 
always be excluded. The other will prove even more controversial (and 
might be amended by Parliament): if the law required authorisation (a 
warrant) by a judge for an investigative action and such authorisation 
has not been obtained. Less serious violations could be the basis for 
exclusion if the judge feels they are detrimental to the integrity of the 
criminal justice authorities.
Since the integrity of the criminal justice system is at stake, not 
just the rights of the specific individual, exclusion is due regardless of 
whether the person requesting the exclusion was personally affected by 
the illegal action. If only the rights of someone who is not being prosecuted 
have been violated, for instance by an illegal search, the evidence can be 
excluded and the defendants could ‘profit’ from this.
The drafters reject the distinction made between ‘police 
information’ on the one and ‘evidence’ on the other hand, since they 
believe the two are often inextricably linked. It does distinguish, as 
104 Whereas the European Court of Human Right is unambiguous case for tor-
ture, on evidence produced by inhuman and degrading treatment, it depends 
on the bearing of the violation on the outcome. (ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 
11 July 2006, n. 54810/00 Jalloh/Germany, § 105 (for torture), but in § 107: 
“the general question whether the use of evidence obtained by an act qualified 
as inhuman and degrading treatment automatically renders a trial unfair can be 
left open” because in the specific case (§ 108) “the Court finds that the use in 
evidence of the drugs obtained by the forcible administration of emetics to the 
applicant rendered his trial as a whole unfair.” Later (ECtHR (Grand Cham-
ber) 1 June 2010, n. 22978/05, Gäfgen/Germany, § 178) it clarified: “Article 
3 may therefore also require, as a rule, the exclusion from use at trial of real 
evidence which has been obtained as the result of any violation of Article 3, even 
though that evidence is more remote from the breach of Article 3 than evidence 
extracted immediately as a consequence of a violation of that Article. Otherwise, 
the trial as a whole is rendered unfair. However, the Court considers that both a 
criminal trial’s fairness and the effective protection of the absolute prohibition 
under Article 3 in that context are only at stake if it has been shown that the 
breach of Article 3 had a bearing on the outcome of the proceedings against the 
defendant, that is, had an impact on his or her conviction or sentence.”
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the Court of Cassation has always done, between the knowledge of the 
existence of offence (which is not affected by the illegality) and the 
actual use of illegal evidence. Only if the initial knowledge has its origin 
in torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, any prosecution would 
become impossible. 
The new rules would have as a consequence that debates on 
how far the authorities can go will once again take place in open court, 
but not that serious criminals would be acquitted because of minor 
bureaucratic errors. Intentional wrongdoing will have more consequences 
than unintentional mistakes. The trial judge105, which will have heard all 
the interested parties, is best placed to balance the conflicting interests 
and decide what is best for society.106 Unlike now, the investigators will 
not know from the outset that whatever happens, the evidence will always 
be used. Such uncertainty can only be a stimulus to respect the law. That 
is what officers have sworn to do, anyway.
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